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ABSTRACT
Mutual fund has become an increasingly important investment vehicle for retail investors, especially among households. Besides developing the 
institutional investment as an efficient momentum trader, the long-established separation of ownership and control in contemporary type of fund 
management has very much caused depreciation in shareholder value under minimum investor protection environment. The unobserved activities 
and widely magnitude decision skills of managers under imperfect contract with the tendency to serve self-interest exacerbates the shareholder 
wealth, predominantly in Shariah mutual fund, pertaining to dual investing interests. This paper reviews the theoretical and empirical literature with 
central attention given to the existing governance structure, Shariah governance in religious based fund, and some other related internal governance 
mechanisms. Concurrently, the review explains theoretically and conceptually the interrelationships among all relevant governance mechanisms. 
After some rigorous discussion and argument, this paper recommends further empirical investigation into this line of research to integrate the gap 
from developed market evidence.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Mutual fund is one of the institutional investors with strong 
role in stimulating financial markets as profitable momentum 
trader contended by Grinblatt et al. (1995), Jones et al. (1997), 
Badrinath and Wahal (2002), and Basak and Pavlova (2013). 
Their transaction may have sizeable effects on asset prices 
following the excess and higher demand of risky assets. 
Consequently, it pushes price further up, generates price pressure 
on stock market, and also influences volatility. As Del Guercio 
(1996) mentions, the prudent stocks are preferred by mutual 
fund and bank, Falkenstein (1996) explains the characteristics 
of those such as high in liquidity, good flow of information, 
and volatility. More specific, Gompers and Metrick (2001) 
state clearly that institutional investors invest in larger stocks, 
more liquid in nature, and relatively low in returns during 
previous year, reflecting the rational and beneficial decision. 
Evidences from literatures have also shown more advantages 
for institutional investors to remain beneficial to its shareholders 
in the market. Each investment decision is carefully taken into 
account to reflect a prudence transaction as indicated by Wermers 
(1999), Nofsinger and Sias (1999), and Wermers (2000), in which 
institutional investors are better informed than other investors and 
certainly good in predicting future returns. Huge sources coupled 
with greater incentives and research expertise make them leader 
in informational efficiency (Gompers and Metrick, 2001) towards 
controlling speculation and asymmetric information. Thus, the 
sustainable growth of this group of investor is fundamental to 
ensure sound and competitive financial market. Yet, mutual fund 
may also ignore shareholder rights and protection on the ground 
of good corporate governance practice. This can be justified 
since investors are bound with a nexus of contract (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Jensen and Ruback, 1983) and relied heavily 
on professional investment services. In the meantime, a research 
has indicated that most investors in mutual fund are those middle 
and low income households (Crenshaw et al., 1997). As mutual 
fund plays the savings role function, these investors have over 
trusted the skills and informational advantage a professional 
manager should have and search for, thus, become passively 
carry out periodical assessment and evaluation of the fund. They 
Fikri, et al.: A Review on Agency Cost of Shariah Governance in Mutual Fund
International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues | Vol 7 • Issue 1 • 2017 531
would rather count on managers and published annual report for 
certain degree of disclosure.
Despite the paralleled operation of Malaysian Islamic financial 
model to an established conventional system, each mutual fund 
is interrelated on the functional basic of operation. Both types 
of mutual fund siphone off inflows to Bursa Malaysia stock 
exchange and many other types of securities, impose fees, and 
superintended by a special governance structure best known as 
Board of Directors (BOD). However, the difference in principle 
embraced by conventional and Shariah law has restricted 
Shariah mutual fund (SMF) activities from engaging investment 
universally (Clarke, 2015). For instance, entertainment, alcohol, 
tobacco, and widely interest based activities are strictly forbidden 
industries for investing by Shariah law (Abbasi et al., 1989). This 
principle is subjected to the belief and value system exclusively 
stipulated in Shariah law (Abdul Ghafar and Achmad, 2010), 
which enforced a screening process (Derigs and Marzban, 2008) 
mainly on business activities, financial and non-financial criteria 
in order to meet the compliance. Investment selection is highly 
crucial to screen out business organizations that violate the law. 
Hence, unlike conventional fund, the investment portfolio held 
by SMF is relatively limited in choice. Sometimes, investment 
decision might change drastically subjected to Shariah Advisory 
Council circulation of decision by the Central Bank of Malaysia.
The huge different in investment practice from conventional fund 
leads to a critical function of Shariah Advisory Panel (SAP), 
many of which have been equally important to BOD with regard 
to the widespread function of monitoring and advising. More 
importantly, both governance structures are designed to safeguard 
the best interest of shareholders. While the latter is keen to 
conserve the shareholder welfare interest, the former examines and 
brings up compliance issue at the primary concern of some Muslim 
shareholders. The existence of such additional layer of governance 
(Abdul Ghafar and Achmad, 2010; Wan Amalina et al., 2013; 
Mollah and Zaman, 2015) implies a different set of interest shown 
by different group of shareholders. Catering the conventional 
shareholder interest fundamentally anticipates maximum outcome 
of notable financial return given the level of risk associated, but, 
preserving the Shariah interest means ensuring the compliance of 
investment activities at all time without violation against Shariah 
principle. Hence, the highest priority of shareholders in SMF is 
that return from their investment has complied permissibly with 
Shariah principle as verified by SAP over the quantifiable measure 
of conventional shareholder interest. Comparatively, conventional 
shareholders expect the maximum desired possible return from 
the belief of future performance as rational investors (Markowitz, 
1952), even though uncertainty impounds the ultimate result, 
while shareholders in SMF may consider profit or loss return as 
secondary objective, as long as the top priority of investing value 
is ensured, though both objectives are equally desired.
The presence of SAP at the decision level of investment (Lewis, 
2010) is likely to enhance the quality of investment activities 
in accordance to Shariah law most of the time, particularly 
the principle and value opted by shareholders. Such additional 
monitoring function is claimed by Wan Amalina et al. (2013) and 
Mollah and Zaman (2015) to strengthen the governance structure 
in reviewing and supervising all related Shariah activities and 
promote good governance as well. As good corporate governance 
indispensable for a corporation such as fund management to 
meet and achieve the ultimate objective, the inherent quality of 
both governance structures through setting control, policies, and 
guidelines disclose the best practice of good governance to realize 
the desirable interest of stakeholders, predominantly shareholders. 
Both internal governance mechanisms are highly concerned 
primarily as effective devices to restraint agency cost, an internal 
cost stemmed from conflict of agency between principal and 
agent encompassing monitoring cost, bonding cost, and residual 
loss (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) against fund value foundation. 
Hence, SAP can be regarded as another internal governance 
mechanism to an equally essential interest of shareholders. 
Their special designation is proper to serve the dual interests of 
shareholders, who emphasize the Shariah principle compliance as 
equally important to fund value as the main investing objective. 
Consequently, additional numbers of decision makers may carry 
benefits to investors as more independent parties are located in 
the fund management to oversee vigilantly. Moreover, the Shariah 
compliance practice, validated by SAP regularly, has brought in 
Shariah governance framework (Lewis, 2010), which complements 
to the existing corporate governance. However, the use of both 
internal governance mechanisms is perplexed through its function 
and effectiveness towards aligning interest, reducing agency cost, 
thereby enhancing fund value. The argument trade-off between 
benefit against cost would have been raised in the model of SMF, 
where both governance structures are prevalent. This paper reviews 
the theoretical and empirical literatures to provide preliminary 
postulations among the simultaneous interrelations of internal 
governance mechanisms to deal with agency problem within fund 
management. Subsequently, it contributes toward enriching the 
literatures of internal governance mechanisms, predominantly 
rarely discussed Shariah governance on agency problem and 
the interrelations. The remainder of this paper proceeds with 
Section 2 elaborates the past literatures and theoretical ground, 
Section 3 briefly explains the methodology, Section 4 provides 
some findings and discussion, and finally Section 5 presents a 
conclusion followed by suggestion for future research.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
The mounting concern of an additional layer of governance roles 
raises the conflict issue in investment decision and excessive 
control over monitoring mechanism since dual interests are 
shown by shareholders in SMF, in order to meet the compliance 
of Shariah principle. In a typical mutual fund contract, variety of 
fees is highlighted as the essential expenses borne by investors 
upon subscription. A huge portion of fee is management fees, 
incurred merely to compensate managers in running the investment 
daily activities. Any excessive fee by the need of another layer 
of governance could exacerbate the agency problem instead of 
functioning as salient nature of contract (Fricke, 2013). Besides, 
an emphasis dependency on control mechanism with regard to 
SAP as additional layer of governance would likely result in 
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higher additional cost of monitoring (Ghoul and Karam, 2007; 
Mollah and Zaman, 2015). Scholars, for instance, Dahlquist et al. 
(2000), Korkeamaki and Smythe Jr. (2004), Babalos et al. (2009), 
and Gil-Bazo and Ruiz-Verdú (2009) have advocated the negative 
relationship between fund fees and before-fee performance. 
Worse off, Mansor et al. (2015) have recently demonstrated new 
evidence on after-fee performance or net value to shareholders 
for SMF. Thus, unstructured immaterial fees for the purpose of 
describing additional necessary activities performed by SAP, 
insisted high price of mutual fund to affect a greater cost of 
agency and diminish fund net value to shareholders. Although 
there are optional governance mechanisms available to rely on, 
for instance, managerial and external institutional ownership that 
offer an incentive appliance in closely motivating managers and 
strengthening the alignment of shareholder interest, the possibility 
of adverse effect and optimal appliance would likely distract the 
effectiveness, especially when there is a greater dependence on 
another monitoring governance mechanism. According to Agrawal 
and Knoeber (1996), the use of single governance mechanism is 
difficult to interpret, but the interrelations among a set of control 
mechanisms may be spurious. Managerial ownership, the best 
alternative internal governance is demonstrated by Benston 
(1985), Ang et al. (2000), Singh and Davidson (2003), Fleming 
et al. (2005), Florackis (2008), McKnight and Weir (2009), Henry 
(2010), and Truong and Heaney (2013) to effectively reduce 
agency cost, while Morck et al. (1988), Hermalin and Weisbach 
(1988), McConnell and Servaes (1990), Holderness et al. (1999), 
Prevost et al. (2002), Mura (2007), and McConnell et al. (2008) 
conclusively provide evidence of positive non-linear relationship 
with corporation performance. Consequently, holdings of shares 
would also probably turn managers into an entrenched controlled 
shareholders (Morck et al., 1988) even in small and average level 
of stakes. It makes them completely powerful and arbitrarily in 
making decision with all sources and information under control. 
Apparently, there is a high possibility of opportunism activity by 
utilizing perquisites and giving priority to their personal interest 
at the expense of shareholders without their knowledge.
The underlying substitution hypothesis is clearly explained by 
Rediker and Seth (1995), that ownership in the form of managers 
and governance structure of monitoring are substitute in nature. 
Evidences to support the hypothesis are largely documented in 
the literatures of Barnhart and Rosenstein (1998), Vafeas and 
Theodorou (1998), Vafeas (1999), Mak and Li (2001), Booth 
et al. (2002), Prevost et al. (2002), Davies et al. (2005), Linck 
et al. (2008), and Li et al. (2015). This is especially true when 
SMF runs within high monitoring function of double layer 
governance. The likelihood of another mechanism, managerial 
ownership, to inherently be effective in practice is extremely low 
correspondingly. If heavy reliance on monitoring mechanism 
persists while shareholders are accountable for additional cost, 
agency cost seems to expand its presence when the alignment of 
interest between managers and shareholders is deviated. Following 
the argument of Hill and Snell (1988), Boyd (1994), and Fu and 
Wedge (2011), watchdog in the governance structure is inclined 
to merely ratify the management decision as simple rubber stamp, 
or even worse, puppets controlled by managers (Almazan and 
Suarez, 2003). Likewise, the function of additional governance 
could be made symbolic, adhering to the regulators requirements 
and convincing retail investors to siphone off more inflows. In 
his model, Raheja (2005) indicates an optimal structure of board 
influenced by the trade off between maximizing incentives for 
insiders to reveal private information of corporation, minimizing 
coordination cost among independent directors on the board, and 
maximizing the ability of outsiders to resist all inferior investments. 
Moreover, he stresses that corporation whose the shareholders are 
better aligned with managers has small size of the board with 
significant ownership of managers. In the similar vein, Adams 
and Ferreira (2007) imply less inclination by managers to become 
friendly sharing information for better monitoring by the board. As 
a result, a larger size of double layer governance structure may be 
ineffective to extract private information and adversely affect the 
ultimate function to align shareholder interest and enhance fund 
value. Among others, Yermack (1996), Eisenberg et al. (1998), 
Callahan et al. (2003), Bebchuk and Cohen (2005), Cheng (2008), 
Adams et al. (2010), and Pathan and Faff (2013) argue on the 
large and staggered board to reflect a higher expense ratio, higher 
coordination cost, and eventually affect operating efficiency and 
fund value. Lack of informational advantage weakens monitoring 
groups and makes the desirable protection on shareholders almost 
impossible. In addition, the absence of incentive mechanism at 
the equilibrium between reward and punishment is most unlikely 
motivated managers to drive and align shareholder interest (Davis 
et al., 1997). At this point, ownership by managers is expected 
insignificant, thus, it would not likely eradicate agency problem 
unless large outside shareholders make its debut, because most of 
these shareholders are actively engaged in large scale monitoring 
to pressure the management. Decision on whether to accept an 
alliance lies at the discretion of managers. The acceptance of large 
funds comes not only with positive growth signal, but also with 
extra constraints relevant to major investment decision. On the 
other hand, abandoning such offer would be the best alternative 
choice to retain the control of managers while monitoring function 
continues to be passive, if only managers enjoy shirking and 
private benefit consumption.
Agency theory has been widely referred, deduced from an 
agency contract that forms a relationship between principal and 
agent to perform a certain task on behalf under a delegation of 
decision authority (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Separation of 
ownership and control over capital in the nature of corporation 
is incorporated to the basis of conjecture (Berle and Means, 
1932). More importantly, separation in the nature of decision 
system, comprised of decision management and decision control 
highlighted by Fama and Jensen (1983a) indicates a clear support 
of separation of residual risk bearing from this decision. In effect, 
the decision system leads to residual claims that are largely 
restricted from its maker. The primary essential assumption 
by Jensen and Meckling (1976) is the boundless and broadly 
divergence of interests dominated by many parties associated 
in the corporation. In addition of subsequent assumption, both 
principal and agent are utilities maximizers. Interest divergence 
between managers and shareholders has led to conflict of interest 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976), causing excessive unrealized 
costs being imposed to investors for the purpose of monitoring, 
even in longer term, resulting in multiple losses. It also makes 
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value creation almost impossible without the optimal function 
of corporate governance (Liu, 2014). Consistent positive fund 
growth in contrary to negative fund value is prevalent to support 
such conviction. In the long run, the fact that investors allocate 
and entrust their capital specified in a contract of principal and 
agent could turn out to be a net loss valued investment following 
the separation of ownership and control if not being managed 
according to the priority owner interest.
The decreasing significant asset value depreciation might happen 
to understand that the growth is deteriorating with least fund 
inflows created. Most probably, the plausible central issue of this 
is how the management creates and adds value over the expenses 
incurred to investors through variety of fees. Dasgupta and Prat 
(2008), Guerrieri and Kondor (2012), Kaniel and Kondor (2012), 
and He and Krishnamurthy (2013) describe the poor performance 
that triggers outflows mainly due to contracting frictions among 
parties, poor managerial ability, and exogenous reason such 
as performance itself. These issues are remained controversial 
and gaining the interest following stringent governance reforms 
worldwide. Thus, the likelihood of principal losing the desired 
maximum interest is greater, exploited by agent personal interest 
as a result of goal conflict. Apart from that, dissimilarity attitudes 
toward risk between contracting parties contribute the magnitude 
of agency problem as argued further by Eisenhardt (1989), 
although risk sharing among parties in organization is substance 
to the survival. The principal allows for risk-taking activities, 
their natural view is opposed to an agent who plays as risk averse. 
She further supports the problem of interest divergence and adds 
another problem of difficulty and costly to verify the duties by 
an agent. Moreover, information asymmetry between principal 
and agent enriches the well-known free-rider problem leading to 
exacerbate the uncertainty outcome. Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
continue by characterizing a further agency conflict derived from 
perquisites of corporation resources for personal consumption. 
Interestingly elaborated in their work, the magnitude of agency 
cost varies among corporations depend on the taste of managers 
in exercising preferences as opposed to value maximization 
through decision making and cost associated to control. Due to an 
increasingly undiversified personal wealth portfolio, Wright et al. 
(1996) argue that such managers are inclined to make decisions 
based upon an evaluation of personal gains and losses that may 
result in the investment selection of non-value maximizing 
objective.
Indeed, agency theory has articulated the common issues perceived 
in an organization with assumptions on the ground of self-interest, 
risk attitude, information treatment, and outcome uncertainty 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). Identifying agency cost from such agency 
relationship is deemed indispensable to forecast the residual 
loss. Subsequently, agency theory elucidates many types of 
control mechanisms toward preventing managerial opportunism. 
It takes a principal to incur additional cost such as monitoring 
cost, certain appropriate incentives, and bonding cost to restrict 
the divergences of possible reduction in welfare experienced 
by them, which categorized as residual loss. The association of 
bonding and monitoring expenditures will be pursued ceaselessly 
as long as marginal benefit outweighs marginal cost. These costs 
are unavoidably due to agency relationship, since it is impossible 
to have non-optimal, inefficient, and agency cost at zero (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976). Therefore, monitoring cost will always be 
positive with regard to agency cost as long as agency relationship 
exists. Most managers are inclined to be a risk averse by implying 
diversification in fund management (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) 
that the cost to ensure an adequate level of diversification exercised 
is linked to agency.
As incentives to motivate managers decrease, similar attempts 
would likely follow to reduce the searching of high potential 
profitable portfolio. Such avoidance of personal cost would result 
in substantially lower value of the fund. There is ample evidence 
for Eisenhardt (1989) to suggest a richer information and more 
efficient monitoring device that could be played by the board. 
Its quality represented by corporate governance information 
and characteristics would enable a better alignment interest 
between principal and agent in cooperative economy. However, 
Cohn and Rajan (2013) suggest a passive minimal function 
by the board depended on potential for agency problem and 
the existence of external governance mechanism, even though 
managers are conscious about the consequences on reputation 
for being poor in managing portfolio. In presence, this group 
of directors, at least, reduces the severe impact of agency, if 
not fully eliminating it. Potential growth is always possible by 
strengthening the governance, as better governed corporation 
devotes better protection to shareholder rights and better 
performance (Klapper and Love, 2004; Beiner et al., 2006; John 
et al., 2008; Cremers et al., 2009). Moreover, the growth of fund 
could be made significantly appealing by consistently adding value 
and minimizing agency cost associated with effective internal 
governance mechanisms in house.
3. METHODOLOGY
To reach the consensus of the premise that Shariah governance 
is likely associated with agency cost, this study adopts a method 
of reviewing widely available literatures across corporate 
governance themes and control mechanisms. It encompasses 
numerous research and academic papers accessible conveniently 
from electronic databases, comprising of 27 papers selected for 
reviewing process as indicated by Table 1 that summarizes a 
list of papers retrieved. The result reveals some interrelations 
among a group of internal governance mechanisms including the 
characteristics of governance structure, Shariah governance, and 
the related expenses incurred. Most interrelations are derived from 
conventional model of corporate governance structure because 
shortfall in infrequent literature on Shariah governance. Having 
too many papers initially undergoing the process, these papers 
can only emphasize some of them that literally provide empirical 
evidence. Reviews illustrate a growing number of papers across 
many countries, using various specific selected governance 
variables, demonstrating diversity in methodology to generate 
robust result, with their respective contributions. Additionally, the 
interrelations presented are likely to relate with two main indicators 
of good interest alignment in a healthy agency relationship; agency 
cost and fund value.
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4. REVIEW ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
The review process on all 27 research papers reveals some of 
governance variables used to have relationship with agency cost 
and firm performance. These variables include, but not limited to, 
board structure, board size, duality function, firm expenses, and 
Shariah board. It can be noted that the large majority of papers are 
conducted the study in advanced economy or developed countries 
with better protection on shareholders rights, while study on 
Shariah governance has long revolved around the Gulf and Islamic 
countries. Thus, it paves the way for future research to examine 
further in emerging market or developing countries with a weaker 
legal protection on shareholder. Although analysis and findings 
summarized in Table 2 are mixed, researchers have indicated 
unambiguous empirical evidence surroundings two governance 
variables; board size and fund expenses. Distinction in findings, 
however, is acceptable and most likely influenced by the sample 
used and methods applied. The usage of more complex statistical 
methods would contribute materially since governance variables 
are emerged, determined, and treated endogenously (Demsetz 
and Villalonga, 2001). Moreover, additional related issues such 
as reverse causality, unobserved heterogeneity, and simultaneity 
are highlighted by many scholars such as Wintoki et al. (2012) 
and Pathan and Faff (2013) appear to lead to spurious claims, 
predominantly on fund value rather than agency cost. Nevertheless, 
the improved methods and diverse evidences would very much 
likely guide the future research in developing empirical evidence 
on Shariah governance.
Apparently, it seems to suggest that board structure has most 
positive relationship, though weak, while some other researchers 
have also suggested the absence of such relationship, to the 
extreme of negative association. More discoveries have led them 
to a curvilinear relationship. In double layer governance, board 
structure is composed with more independence fraction. Shariah 
governance is regarded as additional fraction of independence 
to original corporate governance; this issue is considerably at 
infant stage and has not received much attention, particularly 
on its scrutiny function. Changes in the board structure and 
other governance variables after taking into account the Shariah 
governance variables would likely change the effect or the 
existing relationship, holding all else constant. To date, there is 
only one article which studies on the relationship between Shariah 
governance and conflict of interest and another paper studies on the 
relationship between Shariah governance and firm performance. 
The result from both papers is overwhelming at odds to support 
as the ground on the postulation. Shariah governance is found to 
have a positive relationship with conflict of interest and in the 
meantime, effectively works as internal governance mechanism 
to improve firm performance on certain condition. As a result, this 
review may be able to develop an initial model incorporating the 
relationships at greatly limited evidence.
The causality of interrelations can also be explained by a 
framework as exhibited by Figure 1. Three main governance 
variables are board structure, Shariah governance, and fund 
expenses to relate with fund value and agency cost. The direction 
of relationship is exceptional circumstance when it deals with fund 
value. Two-way direction of relationship might prevail upon the 
issues of endogenous variables and reverse causality. However, 
agency cost is exempted from the issues captured. Note that, a 
governance mechanism may affect inversely on agency cost and 
Table 1: Review of selected studies on interrelations among a series of governance variables
Author (s) and year Geographical sample Interrelated variables
Baysinger and Butler (1985) United States Board structure and firm performance
Kesner and Dalton (1985) United States Board structure, succession, and firm performance
Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) United States Board structure and firm performance
Barnhart et al. (1994) United States Board structure and firm performance
Bathala and Rao (1995) United States Board structure, agency cost, and financial variables
Barnhart and Rosenstein (1998) United States Board structure and firm performance
Vafeas and Theodorou (1998) United Kingdom Board structure and firm performance
Prevost et al. (2002) New Zealand Board structure and firm performance
Wan and Ong (2005) Singapore Board structure and firm performance
Brown and Caylor (2009) United States Board structure and firm performance
Lehn et al. (2009) United States Board structure and firm performance
Pathan and Faff (2013) United States Board structure and firm performance
Eisenberg et al. (1998) Finland Board size and firm performance
Mak and Li (2001) Singapore Board size, board structure, and firm performance
Khorana et al. (2007) United States Board size and firm performance
Cheng (2008) United States Board size and firm performance
Drakos and Bekiris (2010) Greece Board size and firm performance
Pi and Timme (1993) United States Duality function and firm performance
Boyd (1995) United States Duality function and firm performance
Baliga et al. (1996) United States Duality function and firm performance
Iyengar and Zampelli (2009) United States Duality function and firm performance
Tufano and Sevick (1997) United States Board size, board structure, and expenses
Del Guercio et al. (2003) United States Board size, board structure, and expenses
Korkeamaki and Smythe Jr. (2004) Finland Expenses and firm performance
Gil-Bazo and Ruiz-verdú (2009) United States Expenses, corporate governance, and firm performance
Garas (2012) Gulf countries Shariah board and conflict of interest
Mollah and Zaman (2015) 25 most Islamic countries Shariah board and firm performance
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positively on fund value. Hence, a relationship between agency 
cost and fund value requires a validation to suggest truly effective 
mechanisms.
Shariah governance is positioned after board structure and before 
expenses to imply a crucial causality between cause and effect of 
both variables. Surprisingly, the interrelations between governance 
variables are also very likely in double layer governance. If Garas 
(2012) is right about his examination pertaining to conflict of 
interest enlarged by the appointment of SAP, its function is also 
beneficial because it may enhance the fund value if they perform 
supervisory rather than advisory role (Mollah and Zaman, 2015). 
Since Shariah governance component is fundamental within the 
framework of Shariah financial securities, the mechanism should 
be ensured to contribute positively and effectively aligned with 
both primary and secondary interest of shareholders. Despite 
the less important attention paid by these shareholders on the 
return performance, Shariah governance should corroborate the 
governance framework and deliver good governance culture 
practice by always minimizing agency cost, if not maximizing fund 
value. At least, SMF purchased by shareholders is one among good 
investment assets that are adequately advantageous for personal 
diversification due to a lower risk taking activity. Since additional 
layer of governance is at infant stage with significant dispute on 
benefit against cost, further examination highlighting this issue 
would be valuable to extend the line of literature.
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The main objective of this study is to review the theoretical 
and empirical literature to provide preliminary postulations 
among the simultaneous interrelations of internal governance 
mechanisms to deal with agency problem within religious 
based fund management. Internal governance mechanisms are 
especially regarded at the best capability to control the level of 
agency cost and maximize the fund value. In particular, this study 
focuses on the impact of all identified governance variables from 
board structure when SAP in presence to serve second interest 
demanded by shareholders on both agency cost and fund value. 
It is motivated by the ground that additional layer of governance 
may likely aggravate the existing monitoring function and expose 
shareholders to extra fees and cost.
Figure 1: The interrelations framework between internal governance 
mechanisms
Table 2: Review analysis and findings of selected studies
Author (s) and year Method (s) Interrelation findings
Baysinger and Butler (1985) Zero-order correlation (+) Positive relationship
Kesner and Dalton (1985) Contingency analysis Moderate relationship
Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) Piecewise regression No relationship
Barnhart et al. (1994) Instrumental variable, 2SLS, and 3SLS Curvilinear relationship
Bathala and Rao (1995) OLS (+) Positive relationship
Barnhart and Rosenstein (1998) 3SLS Weak (+) positive relationship
Vafeas and Theodorou (1998) OLS and 2SLS No relationship
Prevost et al. (2002) Simultaneous equation and 3SLS (+) Positive relationship
Wan and Ong (2005) HIREG and OLS No relationship
Brown and Caylor (2009) OLS and stepwise regression Mixed relationship
Lehn et al. (2009) 2SLS No relationship
Pathan and Faff (2013) Two step system GMM (−) Negative relationship
Eisenberg et al. (1998) Simultaneous and Poisson estimation (−) Negative relationship
Mak and Li (2001) OLS and 2SLS (−) Negative relationship
Khorana et al. (2007) Multinomial logistic regression No relationship
Cheng (2008) OLS (−) Negative relationship
Drakos and Bekiris (2010) Simultaneous equation and 3SLS (−) Negative relationship
Pi and Timme (1993) Cost efficiency metric (−) Negative relationship
Boyd (1995) Simple correlation (−) Negative relationship
Baliga et al. (1996) Non-parametric test Weak (+) positive relationship
Iyengar and Zampelli (2009) Multivariate analysis No relationship
Tufano and Sevick (1997) Fixed effect, OLS, and pooled regression (+) Positive relationship
Guercio et al. (2003) Fixed effect and OLS (+) Positive relationship
Korkeamaki and Smythe Jr. (2004) Fixed effect, OLS, and random effect (−) Negative relationship 
Gil-Bazo and Ruiz-Verdú (2009) Univariate and Pooled regression (−) Negative relationship
Garas (2012) OLS (+) Positive relationship
Mollah and Zaman (2015) Two step system GMM, GLS random 
effect, and 3SLS
(+) Positive for superviory and negative for advisory
GLS: Genaralized least squares, GMM: Generalized method of moments, HIREG: Hierarchical regression, OLS: Ordinary least squares, 2SLS: Two stage least squares, 3SLS: Three stage 
least squares
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The lack of related study on double layer governance has allowed 
the current study to discuss theoretically and conceptually. 
Findings from review analysis have identified a number of 
governance variables under board structure and some interrelations 
with other governance mechanisms leading to a direction of 
relationship. Although a major number of governance variables 
are unambiguous indicated the causality, distinguished proponents 
are also possible for consideration due to the different method 
adoption. Alternatively, all interrelations are explicitly depicted in 
the research framework grounded by the underlying agency theory. 
On top of discussing the review of literature from governance 
variables on agency cost and fund value, the inherent relationship 
between agency cost and fund value has been left undetermined 
with clear evidence.
This study has attempted on exploring conceptually the 
interrelations among governance variables and predicting agency 
cost associated with Shariah governance. It attempts to bridge the 
gap in related area of conflict of agency with the related underlying 
framework. It provides an avenue for future research to employ 
and estimate the model for new empirical evidence. Extension may 
examine the effectiveness, contribution, and effects of Shariah 
governance structure towards good governance, sustainability, 
and financial performance. The current findings from review are 
valuable to the policy makers and the fund management, especially 
those Shariah financial institutions to uphold the critical function 
of SAP while controlling agency cost at the minimum possible 
level. Ultimately, this study contributes to the literature of double 
layer Shariah governance model and agency problem entailed.
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